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1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of a
random (Nash) equilibrium for a game with a continuum of players.
Moreover, we show how such a random equilibrium existence result can
be used to obtain a Bayesian equilibrium existence theorem for a game
with a continuum of players.
In a seminal paper Nash (1951) introduced the notion of a non-
cooperative equilibrium for a game with a finite number of players.
In particular, according to Nash, a game consists of a finite number
of players, each of whom is characterized by a strategy set and a pay-
off (utility) function, i.e., a real-valued function defined on the
Cartesian product of the strategy sets of the players. A noncoopera-
tive equilibrium for such a game is a strategy vector having the
property that no player can deviate from his/her optimal strategy and
increase his/her payoff. Nash (1951) and subsequently Debreu (1952)
proved the existence of such an equilibrium, using f inite-dimensioaal
fixed point theorems of the Brouwer-Kakutani type.
Three main extensions of the Nash-Debreu results have been ob-
tained in the literature. The first one is due to Glicksberg (1952),
who allowed the strategy set of each player to be a subset of an
infinite-dimensional linear topological space. This equilibrium re-
sult necessitated an infinite-dimensional version of the Kakutani
fixed point theorem [see also Fan (1952) or Browder (1968)]. The
second extension is due to Schmeidler (1973). It allowed for the set
of players to be an atoraless measure space. This development was
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motivated by economic problems [see for instance Aumann (1964) among
others]. In particular, economists are interested in perfectly com-
petitive outcomes, that is, in situations where each player's effect
is "negligible" (which means that he/she is assigned measure zero in
the model). In Schmeidler's approach the strategy sets are finite-
dimensional. Khan (1986) extended this to the infinite-dimensional
case. This work, together with that of Khan-Papageorgiou (1988) and
Yannelis (1987), allowed each player in addition to have a preference
correspondence (instead of the original utility function) which need
not be transitive or complete and therefore may not be representable
by a utility function. The present paper is involved with the third
of the extensions mentioned above. The value of such an extension is
supported by empirical studies, which show that in many instances
players do not behave in a transitive way [see also Shafer-
Sonnenschein (1975) or Yannelis-Prabhakar (1983)]. We present results
which do not only include the three main extensions of the work of
Nash and Debreu, but which also allow for incomplete information. In
particular, our first and main result is an equilibrium existence
theorem which allows the preference correspondence of each agent to
depend on the states of natures of the world, that is, it allows for
random preference correspondences. This result is then used to obtain
an equilibrium existence theorem for a Bayesian game with a continuum
of players.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains some pre-
liminary notation and definitions. In Section 3 we state the main
theorem, whose proof, which involves new ideas and techniques, can be
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found in Section 5. In Section 4 we discuss the assumptions of the
main theorem. Section 6 contains an equilibrium existence result for
a Bayesian game with a continuum of players. Some concluding remarks
can be found in our closing Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by introducing some notation:
2 denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A.,
con A denotes the convex hull of the set A,
/ denotes the set theoretic subtraction,
int denotes interior,
dom denotes domain.
If X is a linear topological space, its dual is the space X' of
all continuous linear functionals on X, and if p e X' and x £ X the
value of p at x is denoted by <p,x>.
Y
Let X, Y be topological spaces. The correspondence $ : X + 2 is
said to be upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) if the set {x £ X : <J>(x) C V}
is open in X for every open subset V of Y. Let (T,t) be a measurable
space and
<J>
: T * 2 be a correspondence. We say that the graph of <J>
,
i.e., the set of all (t,x) £ T x X with x £ 4>(t), is measurable if it
belongs to the product a-algebra T © 8(X), where 6(X) denotes the
Borel a-algebra on X. Moreover, $ : T •* 2 is said to be lower
measurable if for every V open in X the set {t £ T : 4>(t) C\ V * 0}
belongs to t. If
<J>
has closed values then lower measurability of <J>
implies that its graph is measurable, [Castaing-Valadier (1977, III)];
conversely, if <{> has a measurable graph and t is the a-algebra of all
universally measurable subsets of T (in particular, if t is complete
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with respect to some a-finite measure on T) then
<f>
is lower measurable
if it has a measurable graph, [Castaing-Valadier (1977, III)]. Let
(E,ll»ll) be a separable Banach space and let E' be its topological
dual. The weak topology a(E,E') on E will be referred to as the
w-topology; thus, we speak of w-closed, w-compact, etc. There exists
a countable subset {x.} which is dense in E' for the topology a(E',E),
[Castaing-Valadier (1977, 111.32)]. Correspondingly, we define the
weak metric d on E by
00
_.
|<x-y,x.>|
d(x,y) := I
2" 1 2
-T-
i=l 1 + |<x-y,x.>|
i " i i
Note that the d-topology, induced by d on E, is weaker than the
w-topology. Hence, it coincides with the w-topology of any w-compact
subset of E. Note also that the Borel a-algebras 3(E,d), 8(E,w) and
3(E,II»U) coincide, since
i<x, x :>i
Uxll = sup ,
ieN II x.V
l
where 11*11' stands for the dual norm on E ' . Let (T,x,y) be a finite
E
measure space and let X : T * 2 be a correspondence. The set of
(equivalence classes of) all u-integrable functions from (T,x,y) into
R[E] is denoted by L_[L_], [cf. Diestel-Uhl (1977)]. We say that the
R E
correspondence X is y -integrably bounded if there exists a y-
integrable function g e L_ such that for y-a.e. t e T
llxll <^ g(t) for all x e X(t).
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Correspondingly , we define
Lv := {x e L_ : x(t) e X(t) y-a.e.}.
The usual L -norm on L^ is defined by
E
II x II
x
:= /T
llx(t)ll y(dt).
1 °°
The topological dual of (L_,l«l.) is homeomorphic to the space L
,
[E]
of all scalarly measurable essentially bounded (equivalence classes
of) functions from (T,T,y) into (E ' , II • II ' ) , [see for instance Ionescu- -
1 °°
Tulcea (1969)]. The topology a(L_,L_,[E]) will be referred to as the
E ti
weak topology on L
,
[Diestel-Uhl (1977)].
E
3. THE MAIN THEOREM
Below we introduce the notion of a random game with a continuum
of players. This notion of a game extends the ones of Khan (1986),
Khan-Papageorgiou (1988), Schmeidler (1973), Yannelis (1987) by allow-
ing the preference correspondence of each player to depend on the
(random) state of nature. The random game with a continuum of players
is described as follows:
Let (T,T,y) be a complete finite measure space, where T is the
set of players
,
t the set of all possible coalitions, and y is the
set function assigning to each coalition its "weight" for the game.
Let E be a separable Banach space, the set of possible decisions (or
moves) for the players. The players are restricted in making their
decisions as follows: Let X : T * 2 be a given correspondence; then
we require that y-alraost every player t selects his/her decision from
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the set X(t), the strategy set of player t. (The exceptional set would
represent a null coalition of players, whose erratic behavior does not
carry any weight.) Let (ft, J/>p) be a complete probability space,
where ft stands for the possible states of nature
, \fl for set of all
the outcomes, and p for the probability distribution of the outcomes.
Let L denote the set {x e L : x(t) e X(t) u-a.e.}. Let
X E
P:TxftxL
v
.-)*2 be a correspondence revealing the individual
preferences of the players. We require that P(t,w,x) C X(t) for all
t e T and weft. For y-a.e. player t e T the set P(t,u),x) consists
of the decisions which he/she strictly prefers to his/her own decision
x(t), given that u) is the state of nature and given that the decisions
of all participating players modulo null coalitions are represented by
x e Ly (the implicit assumption that the players take their individual
decisions- in a measurable way is standard in this context). Thus,
each player's preference pattern is influenced by the decisions of the
other players (modulo null coalitions) and by the realized state of
nature. However, each player must make his/her decision independently
after having observed the realized state co of nature. Thus, the
resultant of the players' actions (even though they act independently
and noncooperatively ! ) can be modelled as a decision rule f : ft * L ,
which prescribes, for each possible state of nature, the decisions of
all players, modulo null coalitions. For reasons of analytical
tractability we require that the decision rule f be (j/£,B(L ))-
x
measurable. Summing up, a random game with a continuum of players is
formally a quadruple T = [(T,T,y), (ft,Jfc,p), X, P] , where the measure
space (T,T,y), (ft,jL,p) and the correspondences X, P are as described
-7-
above. The game T is said to have a random (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium
if there exists a decision rule f* : ft * L such that for p-a.e.
A
o) e ft
P(t,co,f*(a))) = for y-a.e. t e T.
Thus, with probability one there is at most a powerless null coalition
of players having "something left to be desired" under the equilibrium
rule f*: no player t outside the null coalition disposes of a decision
which he/she would strictly prefer to his/her actual decision f*(co)(t)
prescribed by f*. Clearly, the above definition is a generalization
of the usual notion in economics and game theory, [see, e.g., Khan
(1986), Khan-Papageorgiou (1988), Schmeidler (1973), Yannelis (1987)].
[We especially recommend the excellent survey of Khan (1985).]
We now state the conditions needed for the proof of our main
theorem. A detailed discussion of these is given in Section 4.
(CO) the a-algebra T is countably generated,
(CI) X has nonempty convex w-compact values,
(C2) X is y-integrably bounded and has a x Q 3 (E)-measurable
graph,
(C3) dom (con P) is a T O Jt® 8(L )-raeasurable subset of
A.
T x Q x L
,
a.
(C4) there exists no decision rule f : ft * Ly such that for p-a.e.
u e Q, f(u))(t) e con P(t ,a),f (to) ) for y-a.e. t e T.
We also require the existence of a correspondence
p
a : dom (con P) •* 2 with measurable graph and nonempty values, such
that for every t e T, u e ft,
me
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(C5) a(t,a),x) C con P(t,u>,x) C X(t) for every x e L
,
X.
(C6) a(t,u),») : Lv * 2 is u.s.c. with w-closed convex values,A
(C7) dom (con P(t, &),•)) is w-open.
Our main result, whose proof is deferred to Section 5, can now
be stated.
Main Theorem : Let T = [(T,t,u), (ft, j^,p), X, P] be a random ga
satisfying the conditions (C0)-(C7). Then V has a random equilibrium.
As a corollary of our Main Theorem, we can obtain an extension of
the results of Khan (1986) and Schmeidler (1973) by allowing the
utility function of each player to be random. In particular, let
G = [(T,x,y), (ft,J£,p), X, u] be a random game with a continuum of
players as defined above, with the exception that each player t in T
is now equipped with a random utility function u : ft x X(t) * LY + R.t a
The game G is said to have a random Cournot-Nash equilibrium if there
exists an (Jt,3(L ))-measurable function f* : ft + L such that
A A
u (o),f (u)),f*(co)) = max u (a),y , f *(a>) )
C t
yeX(t) t
for u-a.e. t e T and p-a.e. to e ft.
Now we can state the following corollary of our main theorem:
Corollary 3.1 : Let G = [(T,T,y), (ft,jt>P^> x » u ^ ^e a rariclom game
with a continuum of players satisfying the conditions (C0)-(C2) and
in addition:
(Nl) The set {(t,u>,y) eTxftxE :y£ X(t), u (u),y,x)
_< 6}
belongs to T ®jt® 3(E) for every 6 e R, x e L ,
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(N2) u (oj,*,x) is quasi-concave on X(t) for every t e T, « E 8,
(N3) u (to., • , • ) is continuous on X(t) x L for every t E T, ai e ft.
Then G has a random Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof ; Define the correspondence P:TxftxL->-2 by
P(t,u,x) := {y e X(t) : u (<u,y,x) > u
t
(a>,x(t) ,x)}
.
Then in view of Remarks 4.4, 4.5 in the next section it is easily seen
(given the conditions (N1)-(N3)) that the correspondence P satisfies
all the conditions of the Main Theorem. The resulting random equi-
librium is easily seen to form a random equilibrium for G.
The above Corollary will be used in Section 6 to prove the exis-
tence of a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. In the next section we
will discuss the conditions used in the Main Theorem.
4. DISCUSSION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we discuss a number of cases where the technical
conditions of the Main Theorem are fulfilled. The conditions of the
first two cases presented here are not attractive from a more prac-
tical standpoint, but in the third and fourth case the conditions are
of a rather standard nature. The key instrument there is formed by
recent Caratheodory selection results of Kim-Pikry-Yannelis (1987,
1988).
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Remark 4.1 : Condition (C4) is obviously weaker than
(C4') for p-a.e. to £ ft there does not exist x e Lv such that
x(t) e con P(t,u),x) for y-a.e. t £ T.
Condition (C3) is weaker than
E(C3 f ) con P : T x fl x L + 2 is a measurable correspondence.
Remark 4.2 : Suppose that
-x*
2 '
--—X
(El) con P : T x Q x LY - has a x ®J£® 8(L x E)-measurable
graph,
E(E2) con P(t,o), # ) : LY -> 2 is u.s.c. and has nonempty w-closedA
values for every t £ T, oo £ ft.
Then conditions (C5)-(C7) hold.
Proof : Define a := con P; then (C5)-(C7) hold trivially.
Remark 4.3 : Suppose that (El) holds and that
E(E3) con P(t,o),») : Lv + 2 is l.s.c. and has w-closed valuesA
(possibly empty) for every t £ T, w e ft,
(E4) the a-algebra T &j£ is complete with respect to y x p.
Then conditions (C5)-(C7) hold.
Proof : By the definition of lower seraicontinuity
,
(E3) implies
that (C7) holds. Also, it follows from (E3)-(E4) that the Caratheodory
selection result of Kira-Pikry-Yannelis (1987, Thm. 3.1) obtains.
Hence, there exists a (t ®,J£® 3(L ), 3(E) )-measurable function
a : dom (con P) * E such that for all t e T. and oo £ ft
a(t,u), # ) is continuous on dom (con P(t,u),»)) and
a(t,w,x) £ con P(t,w,x) for all x £ dom con P(t,w,»).
Therefore, a(t,co,x) := (a(t,o),x)} satisfies (C5), (C7).
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In (E2) and (E3) the correspondence con P is required to have
w-closed values. In view of condition (C4) this is hardly satisfac-
tory, since P(t,u,x) represents for player t the decisions which
he/she would strictly prefer over x(t) under the state of nature a).
Fortunately, in the following cases the values of con P need not be
closed.
The following case is a variant of the one above. It follows by
applying the variant in Kim-Pikry-Yannelis (1987, Thm. 3.2) of the
Caratheodory selection result used above. The proof in this case
remains exactly the same.
Remark 4.4 : Suppose that (El) and (E4) hold and
(E5) con P(t,o),») : L »• 2 is l.s.c. for every t £ T, u e ft,
A.
and at least one of the following two conditions are satisfied:
(E6) E is finite-dimensional,
(E6* ) int (con P(t,w,x)) is nonempty for every (t,to,x) £ dora (con P).
Then conditions (C5)-(C7) hold.
Remark 4.5 : Suppose that (El), (E4) hold and that for all t £ T
and to £ ft
(E7) con P(t,u,«) (x) := {y £ L : x £ con P(t,to,y)} is weakly
A.
open for every x £ E,
(E8) rel int con P(t,oj,x) is nonempty for every x £ dom (con P(t,co,»)),
where the relative interior is taken with respect to X(t).
Then conditions (C5)-(C7) hold.
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Proof : The proof is entirely similar to the proof of Remark 4.3;
only this time we invoke to the Caratheodory selection result of
Kim-Pikry-Yannelis (1988, Main Theorem).
5. PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
We begin by proving some preparatory results that are needed for
the proof of our main theorem.
The compactness part of the following result is commonly referred
to as Diestel's theorem. This was given by Diestel (1977) for a
"dominating" correspondence X(t) which did not vary with t. In its
present form the theorem was first stated by Byrne (1978, Thm. 3),
[see also Balder (1990) for an extension involving a.e. convergence of
arithmetic averages]. Note also that the nonemptiness part of the
result below is a direct consequence of the von Neumann-Aumann
measurable selection theorem, [Castaing-Valadier (1977, III. 22)].
Theorem 5.
1
: Suppose that conditions (C1)-(C2) hold. Then L is
a nonempty convex and weakly compact subset of L .
Proposition 5.2 : Suppose that conditions (C0)-(C2) hold. Then
the weak topology of L coincides with the topology induced by the
A
weak metric D of L .
E
Proof : By (CO) the Banach space (L , 11*11 ) is separable. Thus, LEl E
has a well-defined weak metric D (see the definition given in Section
2). By (CI), (C2) Lv is a weakly compact subset of L_ (apply Theorem
5.1), so by what was said following the introduction of the weak
metric, the weak topology and the D-topology coincide on Ly .
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Let (Y,p) be a separable metric space, and let y : T x ft * Y -*- 2
be a given correspondence such that Y(t,w,y) C X(t) for every t e T,
weft. Correspondingly, we define iji : fl x y ^ 2 ^ by
4»(u,y) := {x £ L : x(t) e Y(t,u>,y) y-a.e.}.
The first part of the next result is well-known [see for instance
Khan-Papageorgiou (1987) or Yannelis (1987, 1989)]. We give a new
proof, which matches the proof of its second part.
Proposition 5.3 : Suppose that (CO), (CI), and (C2) are valid. If
Y(t,uj,») : Y + 2 is w-u.s.c. with w-closed, convex values
for every t £ T, co e ft,
then
iJKw , •) : Y > 2 ^ is weakly u.s.c. for every weft
If in addition
Y has ax® $,$ 8 (Y x E)-measurable graph,
then there exists a correspondence ip ' : ft x Y + 2 x such that
^
' (w , • ) = «|/((0,«) for p-a.e. to e ft, and
ty ' has a (7u® 3(L )-measurable graph.
Proof : To prove the first statement, it is enough, in view of
Theorem 5.1, to prove that for arbitrary fixed u) e ft the corre-
spondence <J;(w,«) has a closed graph in Y x L [Aubin-Cellina (1984,
A
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Cor. 1.1.1)]. To this end, let {y } converge in Y to y, and let
{x, } converge weakly to x in L , x, e ^(w,y, ). Define
m:TxftxYxE->- (0,-H») by
m(t,u),y,x) : =
if x e T(t,w,y)
+00 if not ,
Since w e ft is fixed, we shall abbreviate as follows:
l(t,y,x) := m(t,w,y,x).
The desired conclusion x e ^(^,y) follows now immediately from apply-
ing a classical lower semi continuity theorem to the outer integral
functional I. : Y x r > {0,+°°}, given by
^(y.x) := J T l(t,y,x(t)) y(dt),
Note that for every t e T the function l(t,»,«) is l.s.c. on Y x (E,w),
since the graph of Y(t,oj,«) is a closed subset of Y x X(t). Note also
that the function l(t,y,») is convex. Thus, all the conditions of the
lower semicontinuity result in Balder (1984, Thm. 3.1) hold, and we
obtain
I.(y,x)
_< lim inf I i^Yk »\) = °-
(Note the y 's act as constant functions on T,' which converge Co the
constant function y. ) In view of the definition of outer integration it
follows immediately that y-a.e. l(t,y,x(t))
_< 0, i.e., x(t) e y(t,o),y).
For the proof of the second part we employ a very similar argu-
ment, which is based on the key observation that the Borel a-algebras
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8(14,1*1.) and 8(L ,D) coincide (as was noted following the definitionEl E
of the weak metric). Note first that raeasurability of the graph of y
is actually equivalent to x ® Jl ® 3(Y x E)-measurability of m,
defined above. Also, as we already saw above, l(t,*, # ) := m(t,u,»,«)
is l.s.c. on Y x (E,w)—hence a fortiori on Y x (E,ll»ll) for every
t £ T, ti) e ft. Thus, ra is a so-called normal integrand on
T x n x y x (E,ll«ll). By the construction given in Balder (1984,
Appendix) there exist a nondecreasing sequence {m } of
t ® Jt® 3(Y x E)-measurable functions m rTxftxyxE-*- [0,-H»)
and a T ©^-measurable subset N of T x Q , (y x p)(N) = 0, such that
for every (t,u) e T x fi, n e N
In (t,w,y,x) - m (t ,w,y' ,x' ) I < np(y,y') + nllx - x'
n n —
for all y e Y, x e E and for every (t,co) e (T x Q) / N, n e N
lim m (t,a),y,x) = m(t,w,y,x) for all y e Y, x e E.
n n
From the second property it follows immediately, by the monotone
convergence that for p-a.e. oj e R for all y e Y and x e L
(5.1) lira + I (u,y,x) = I (u),y,x),
n m m J * *
n
where the integral functionals 1,1 : ft x Y x J. > [0,+°°] are
m' ra X
n
defined by
I
m
(u),y,x) := / m(t,o),y,x(t)) u(dt),
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etc. (note that there is no longer need for outer integration). By
the Lipschitz continuity property of the {m } it follows elementarily
that for every n £ N
I (u),»,«) is continuous on Y * (LJI*!!,) for every co e ft.
m El
n
Also, it is a basic fact, [e.g., see Neveu (1964, III)] that for
every n e N
I (• ,y,x) is
,/c -measurable for every y e Y, x e L .
in A
n
Therefore, it follows from Castaing-Valadier (1977, III. 14), in view
of the separability of Y x (L„, II • II
, ) , that for every n e N
I is Jl® B(Y x L)-measurable.m X
n
Hence, by (5.1)
I is Jt® 3(Y x I. )-raeasurable.
ra X
Finally, it remains to define (Jj ' : f! x Y + 2 A by specifying its graph
to be the set
{(w,y,x) e 8 x Y'x L : l ira + I (u),y,x) < 0};
X n m —
n
then the proof is over, in view of (5.1) and the definition of m.
Remark 5.4 : An alternative proof of the measurability part of
Proposition 5.3 can be given using Castaing-Valadier (1977, III. 15).
In contrast to the proof given above, one then has to exploit the fact
that y has convex values.
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We are now ready to complete the proof of our Main Theorem.
Proof of the Main Theorem : To begin with, note that by Theorem
5.1 and Proposition 5.2 the space (L ,D) is raetrizable, compact and
hence separable for the weak topology. (This space will play the role
of (Y,p) in the previous section.) We define the correspondence
F : T x B x L
x
2
E
by
F(t,u,x) :=
a(t,to,x) if x e dom (con P(t,to,0)
X(t) if not.
From the definition of upper semicontinuity it follows from (C5), (C6)
that for every t e T, to e ft, F(t,u>,») : L^ * 2 J is upper semicon-
tinuous; also, F(t,oo,») has w-compact convex values in X(t) for every
t e T, oj e ft by (CI), (C5) and the properties of a. Therefore, by
Proposition 5.3 the convex-valued correspondence B : ft x L * 2 x
,
a.
defined by
B(a),y) := {x e L : x(t) e F(t,o»,y) for y-a.e. t e T}
,A
is such that for every weft
B(oo,») : Ly * 2
x is weakly u.s.c.
Also, for every go z ft, y e LY the correspondence F(»,oj,y) has a
measurable graph and nonempty values, by (C3) and the definitions of
a, F. Hence, the values of B are nonempty by the von Neumann-Aumann
measurable selection theorem [Castaing-Valadier (1977, 111.22)]. By
Theorem 5.1, L is a nonempty convex weakly compact subset of L .
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Hence, it follows from the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem [Fan
(1952), Glicksberg (1952)] that for every u e ft
(5.2) there exists x e L such that x e B(to,x).
X
By (C3) and the definitions of a , X the correspondence F is seen
to have a t ® Jf, ® 3 (L x E) -measurable graph. Hence, by Proposi-
x
tion 4.3 there exists a correspondence B' : ft x LY »• 2
*" with
A.
Jfc ® 3(L x L )-measurable graph such that B'(u),») B(to,») p-a.e.
x x
Therefore, it is immediate that the graph
G := {(o),y,x) e ft x l x L : y = x, x e B'(o),y)}
x x
of the correspondence $ f) B' is also i/£® 3(L x L) -measurable,X X
where $ : SI x L + 2 ^ is defined by $(w,y) := {y} (note that the
x
graph of $ is measurable by virtue of the fact that L is separable
x
and metric). By (5.2) we have that for p-a.e. weft the section of G
at to is nonempty. Hence, by the von Neumann-Aumann measurable selec-
tion theorem [Castaing-Valadier (1977, III. 22)] there exists a
( Jt ® 3(L ), 3(L x L ))-measurable function h : ft + L x L suchXXX a. X
that
(a) ,h. (co ) ,h ? (o)) ) e G for p-a.e. to e ft ,
where h
,
h_ stand for the coordinate functions of h. In particular,
this implies the following
h„(o)) e B' (a) ,h„(a)) ) for p-a.e. to e ft.
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By the definition of B' and B, this implies that for p-a.e. u £ fl
h„(o»)(t) £ F(t,oj,h
2
(u))) for p-a.e. t e T.
If there were a set C etffc. , p(C) > 0, such that
dora (con P(t,oj,h (w))) # p-a.e. for every u e C, then by the defini-
tion of F for every u e C
h (co)(t) e a(t,u,h (oj)) e con P(t,to,h (cj)) for p-a.e. t e T.
This would contradict (C4). Thus we conclude that for p-a.e. co e ft
P(t,w,tu(a>)) C con P(t,co,h
2
(w)) = for p-a.e. t e T,
which proves that h
9
is the desired rule to achieve a random equi-
librium for the game I
.
6. THE EXISTENCE OF A SYMMETRIC BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM
We now show how our main result can be used to prove the exis-
tence of an equilibrium for a Bayesian game with a continuum of
players. For somewhat similar finite player Bayesian games, existence
results have been obtained by Balder (1988), Harsanyi (1967), Milgrom-
Weber (1985) and Yannelis-Rustichini (1988).
A symmetric Bayesian game with a continuum of players is a
sextuple B = [ (T,t ,p ) , (ft , Jt,p) ,X, u, J ,q], where (T,x,p) is the
measure space of players
, (^,(/£,p) a probability space denoting all
the possible states of nature
,
whose probability distribution p may be
unknown, X : T + 2 the decision correspondence from T into the
separable Banach space E, u : 0. x X(t) x L_ •* R the random utility
t A.
trer
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function of player t in T, 2) a sub-o-algebra of JU representing the
information pattern available to the players (supposed to be the same
for all players; hence the adjective symmetric for the game), and q
a transition probability from (ft
,
3 ) into (tt,Jt) representing play<
t's a posteriori belief about p : the realized weft, (by means of the
possibly incompletely known distribution p) gives rise to player t
observing an outcome S in J> ; then q (u);») represents player t's
belief about p, based on the observed u. A symmetric Bayesian equi-
librium for B now consists of an 3 -measurable function f* : ft •*• L
A.
such that
v
t
(u,f*(o)),f*(u»)) = max v (w,y,f*(u>)
)
yeX(t)
for y-a.e. t e T and p-a.e. weft.
Here we define player t's a posteriori expected utility function by
v
t
(w,y,x) := JV u
t
(u)',y,x) q
t
(u;du>')
The result below may be seen as an extension of Theorem 3.3 in
Yannelis-Rustichini (1988) to Bayesian games with a continuum of
players.
Corollary 6. 1 . Let B = [ (T,t ,y ) , (ft , (JXT, p ) ,X, u, ^ ,q ] be a Bayesian
game with a continuum of players satisfying the conditions (C1)-(C2),
(N1)-(N3). Moreover, suppose that
3* s countably generated,
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and that for every t e T, co e Q
u (co,»,«) is q (a) ; • )-integrably bounded.
Then B has a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof : By the dominated convergence theorem it follows immediately
from (N3) that for every t e T, oj e Q, v (co , • , • ) is continuous on
X(t) x L„. Moreover, it is easily seen that v is measurable in the
sense that the set {(t,o,y) eTxft*E:ye X(t), u (w,y,x)
_< 6}
belongs to T ®S £> 3(E) for every 6 e R, x e L . It follows from
A.
(N2) that v ((i),«,x) is quasi-concave on X(t) for every t e T, oo e fi,
x e L . We can now consider the Bayesian game B as a random game
[ (T,t ,\i ) , (ft , jt ,p) ,X,v] . This random game satisfies all the condi-
tions of Corollary 3.1, so there exists an 3 -measurable equilibrium
decision rule f* : ft + L for the random game. This rule is precisely
A
the desired symmetric Bayesian equilibrium rule for B.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Remark. 7.1 ; The Main Theorem as well as Corollary 3.1 can be ex-
tended in a straightforward manner to random abstract economies, that
is, abstract economies as defined in Khan-Papageorgiou (1988) or
Yannelis (1987), with the only exception that preference correspondences
as well as constraint correspondences are now allowed to depend on the
states of nature of the world. Obviously, such results can be used to
obtain equilibrium existence results for either random or Bayesian ex-
change economies.
-22-
Remark 7,2 : The form of the Bayesian game with a continuum of
players described in Section 6 can be generalized by replacing the
random utility function u : ft x X(t) x L + R of each player by a
t A
random preference correspondence P : T x 8 x L + .2 , In this new
A
setting the a posteriori preference correspondence of player t is now
defined by
n(t,u),x) := !Q q (ujdw') P(t,co',x),
where the integral of the correspondence P(t,»,x) is defined in the
usual way [see for instance Yannelis (1989)]. By setting in Theorem
6.1, E = R and replacing the assumptions (N1)-(N3) by:
(Nl
'
) con II(»,»,») is lower measurable,
(N2') for each measurable function x : ft + Ly ,
x (a)) i con II(t ,a),x(oj) ) for almost all t in T and for
almost all a) in ft,
(N3') for each fixed t in T and w in ft, P(t,u),») is l.s.c,
P is integrably bounded and it has a measurable graph,
then one can prove the existence of a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium
for this more general form of a Bayesian game. In particular, by
Theorem 3.3 in Yannelis (1989) for each fixed t £ T and weft,
H(t,u),») is l.s.c. Hence, (in view of Remark 4.4) it follows from the
Main Theorem that there exists an
J) -measurable function f* : ft + L
such that for almost all t in T, II(t ,w, f *(to) ) = for almost all weft,
-23-
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